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Summary 
 
This article’s premise is that the practice of representatives of international 
organizations has something important to tell us about what it means to ‘do 
desecuritization’. The analysis provides a qualitative process-tracing of diplomacy by 
the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). It finds that ‘new 
diplomats’ can ‘do desecuritization’ differently. By rearticulating norms, as well as 
negotiating interests, the HCNM is able to escape the constraints imposed by security 
grammar and begin to transform the friend–enemy distinction within states. ‘New 
diplomats’ like the HCNM are capable of initiating such fundamental changes within 
states because their non-state platforms and institutional cultures transcend traditional 
international dichotomies of ‘us’ and ‘them’. These findings add nuance to our 
understanding of desecuritization as practice and suggest a novel methodological 
approach for studying desecuritization empirically. 
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Introduction 
 
(De)securitization has emerged as an important theoretical framework in which to think 
about the questions that diplomats have traditionally handled: how to preserve peace in 
the threat of conflict; and, even more fundamentally, how to replace enmity with 
friendship. The premise of this article is that the practice of ‘new diplomacy’ by 
representatives of international organizations (IOs) has something important to tell us 
about what it means to ‘do desecuritization’:  
 
IOs — particularly the officials who comprise their staffs or bureaucracies — 
have a capacity for independent action that is not readily captured by existing 
theories of international relations.1 
 
More specifically, such actors offer a rich empirical context in which to analyse how 
                                               
1 Andrew Cortell and Susan Peterson, ‘Synthesizing Rationalist and Constructivist Approaches to IOs: 
Lessons from the WTO and WHO’, paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies 
Association, Honolulu, Hawaii (2005), p. 2. 
 different forms of (de)securitization may combine, and with what effects. The resulting 
analysis adds nuance to our understanding of desecuritization as practice, and it offers a 
novel methodological approach for studying desecuritization empirically. 
The article consists of two parts. The first section outlines a framing of 
(de)securitization as a sector-specific normative practice dependent on the 
interpretative capacities of representatives of international organizations. This framing 
of (de)securitization involves an ‘interpretivist process-tracing approach’2 that draws 
fresh insight from the international relations literature on norm entrepreneurs. The 
second section, following Anne Orford,3 is a ‘style of descriptive analysis’4 that looks at 
the practice of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)’s High 
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) to ‘make visible’ novel forms of 
desecuritization.  
By ‘making visible’ the practices of the HCNM, this methodology shows that different 
sectors of diplomacy ‘do desecuritization’ differently. Whereas ‘classical’ diplomats 
based in foreign ministries ‘do desecuritization’ as ‘stabilization’,5 ‘new diplomats’ also 
‘do desecuritization’ as ‘rearticulation’. ‘New diplomats’ can initiate ‘fundamental 
transformations of the public sphere including a move out of the friend–enemy 
distinction’,6 because of their unique non-state platforms and institutional cultures. As a 
result, ‘new diplomats’ are able to escape the classic ‘security problematique’.  
 
 
Diplomats ‘Do (De)Securitization’ 
 
Diplomacy is a ‘speech act’; ‘The focus of diplomacy was and is communication’.7 
Whether we are considering the ‘classical diplomacy’ of foreign office officials or the 
‘new diplomacy’ of international organizations such as the OSCE, the practice of 
diplomacy remains inherently discursive: ‘diplomacy is basically an intersubjective 
interaction’.8 In essence, diplomats are ‘conscious producers and interpreters of signs’.9 
Political processes like diplomacy and security are ‘a collective attempt at finding or 
creating meaning in the social, in making the right policy’.10  
There are obvious parallels between diplomacy and (de)securitization. Diplomacy is 
‘a timeless, existential phenomenon’11 between friendship and enmity. Similarly, the 
friend–enemy distinction and the (im)possibility of mediation between these differences 
are ‘central to the meta-choices’ that underpin (de)securitization.12 (De)securitizing 
moves (in which an actor discursively presents something as (not) an existential threat) 
are thus distinct from successful (de)securitization — the latter will only exist if and 
when the target audience accepts the (de)securitizing move.13  
                                               
2 Stefano Guzzini, ‘Securitization as a Causal Mechanism’, Security Dialogue, vol. 42, no. 4–5 (2011), p. 340. 
3 Anne Orford, ‘In Praise of Description’, Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 25, no. 3 (2012), pp. 609–
625. 
4  Clive Barnett, ‘On the Milieu of Security: Situating the Emergence of New Spaces of Public 
Action’, Dialogues in Human Geography, vol. 5, no. 3 (2015), p. 338. 
5 Iver Neumann, ‘After Securitization: Diplomats as De-Securitizers’, Baltic Journal of Political Science, vol. 1, 
no. 1 (2012), pp. 7–21. 
6 Lene Hansen, ‘Reconstructing Desecuritization: The Normative–Political in the Copenhagen School and 
Directions for How to Apply It’, Review of International Studies, vol. 38, no. 3 (2012), p. 543.  
7 Juergen Kleiner, ‘The Inertia of Diplomacy’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 19, no. 2, (2008), p. 321. 
8 Kleiner, ‘The Inertia of Diplomacy’, p. 322. 
9 Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (Basingstoke, 2005), p. 83. 
10 Ole Wæver, ‘Politics of Movement: A Contribution to Political Theory on and in Peace Movements’, in K. 
Kodoma and U. Vesa (eds), Towards a Comparative Analysis of Peace Movements (Palgrave: London 1990), 
pp. 21–22. 
11 Jönsson and Hall, Essence of Diplomacy, p. 3. 
12 Hansen, ‘Reconstructing Desecuritization’, p. 528. 
13 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1998), p. 25. 
 This semiotic similarity between diplomacy and (de)securitization was previously 
noted by Iver Neumann.14 Neumann points out that ‘diplomacy is by definition a 
discourse that is analytically distinct from violent practices’, even though it is often ‘to 
be found in tandem with such violent practices’.15 The diplomat is thus positioned in a 
space between normal and emergency politics. The practice of the diplomat is to secure 
peace, the urgency of which is underscored by the ever-present possibility of conflict.  
Diplomacy requires at least a minimal relaxation of the friend–enemy distinction, 
sufficient to enable a common political discourse to develop. The diplomat: 
  
[…] seeks always to reason or persuade rather than to bully or threaten. He tries to 
show that the objective for which he is seeking is consistent with the other parties’ 
interests, as well as with his own. He prefers to speak of ‘rights’ rather than 
‘demands’, and to show that these rights flow from rules or principles which both 
states hold in common.16  
 
And this produces a dilemma: a common political discourse is a precondition for 
diplomacy, and it is diplomacy that makes it possible for such a common political 
discourse to develop. While this ‘diplomacy dilemma’ is most apparent in ‘stuck security 
dilemmas’ like that of the Cold War,17 the ontological problem is implicit in all ‘classic’ 
diplomacy scenarios by virtue of the space in between normal and emergency politics 
where it is practised. Some theorists suggest a similar ‘ontological contradiction’ 
between being and becoming desecuritized, ‘such that one cannot, in principle, ever 
define a conflict as inherently solved’.18  
Yet, in practice, diplomacy and desecuritization do occur and conflicts do end. And it 
is by incorporating a practical understanding of (de)securitization — as done by ‘new 
diplomats’ — that this article contributes to its more nuanced understanding: 
  
This concern stems from an impatience with what could, perhaps unkindly, be 
called ‘armchair analysis’; by which I mean text-based analyses of global politics 
that are not complemented by different kinds of contextual data from the field, data 
that may illuminate how foreign policy and global politics are experienced as lived 
practices.19 
 
 (De)securitization is conceptualized as operating at different levels of analysis. As a 
result, within securitization studies there is a distinction between ‘ontological analysis’ 
that is directed at ‘what is possible and might become’ and ‘empirical analysis’ that 
‘identifies the trajectory of a given instance or case of desecuritization’.20 Lene Hansen 
postulates four ideal types of desecuritization, each of which may be approached from 
these different starting points: 
 
Change through stabilization is when an issue is cast in terms other than security, 
but where the larger conflict still looms; replacement is when an issue is removed 
from the securitized, while another securitization takes its place; rearticulation is 
when an issue is moved from the securitized to the politicized due to a resolution of 
the threats and dangers that underpinned the original securitization; and silencing 
is when desecuritization takes the form of a depoliticization, which marginalizes 
                                               
14 Neumann, ‘After Securitization’. 
15 Neumann, ‘After Securitization’, p. 10. 
16 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012), p. 
172. 
17 Stefano Guzzini, ‘A Dual History of Securitization’, DISS Working Paper no. 2 (2015), p. 6. 
18 Hansen, ‘Reconstructing Desecuritization’, p. 543. 
19 Iver Neumann, ‘Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy’, Millennium, vol. 31, no. 
3 (2002), p. 628.  
20 Hansen, ‘Reconstructing Desecuritization’, p. 539. 
 potentially insecure subjects.21 
 
A practice-based approach to diplomacy has already yielded fruitful insights into the 
empirics of desecuritization and its synergies with ‘classic diplomacy’. By a careful 
analysis of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iver Neumann was able in 2012 to 
identify what he termed ‘diplomatization’ as an exemplar of one of the four ideal types 
of desecuritization — namely, stabilization.22 Stabilization has ‘a conservative, system-
stabilizing character’23 and it thus approximates well to the ‘classic diplomacy’ long 
associated with ministries of foreign affairs. Yet ‘it turned out that the subject matter — 
desecuritization — changed the face of diplomacy by changing the way it had to be 
conducted: less state-to-state, more networked’.24  
If desecuritization ‘changes the face’ of ‘classic diplomacy’, then it seems likely that it 
would also ‘change the face’ of ‘new diplomacy’. ‘New diplomacy’ is by definition already 
‘less state-to-state and more networked’25 than ‘classic diplomacy’. Could it be that ‘new 
diplomats’ are moving beyond stabilization to embrace other forms of desecuritization? 
Such a finding would help to explain why ‘new diplomacy’ ‘makes traditional diplomats 
and many governments very uncomfortable’.26 
The practice of the HCNM is a particularly interesting case to consider in this respect, 
because it appears to have gone beyond its original stabilizing mandate. HCNM 
diplomacy now includes policy recommendations in areas such as education that are not 
traditionally associated with security. Arguably, this expanded practice is intended to 
bring about a more fundamental resolution of the security dilemma: the rearticulation of 
the friend–enemy distinction. Why did this change in mandate occur, and how did it 
change the process of diplomacy practised by the HCNM? More fundamentally, does this 
change in practice suggest changes to the way in which we think about ‘doing 
(de)securitization’? 
 
 
Process-Tracing the HCNM’s Practice of Desecuritization 
 
In order to analyse how the HCNM ‘does desecuritization’, this article returns to the 
basic questions identified by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde: ‘who can “do” 
desecuritization successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what 
effects?’27 To answer these questions, the article adopts a broadly ‘interpretivist 
process-tracing approach’28 that draws fresh insight from the international relations 
literature on norm entrepreneurs. This involves ‘assembling new archives that might 
make visible the transformations articulated in the doctrines, practices and 
rationalizations’29 of the HCNM: 
 
In principle, successful desecuritization, just like its opposite securitization, must be 
contingent upon social and contextual conditions. Similarly, we can assume that 
some actors may be better positioned to make successful discursive interventions 
of this kind, and that some issues may be easier to desecuritize than others. After 
thus subdividing the social, external speech-act conditions into actor authority and 
                                               
21 Hansen, ‘Reconstructing Desecuritization’, p. 529. 
22 Neumann, ‘After Securitization’, pp. 7–8. 
23 Neumann, ‘After Securitization’, p. 6. 
24 Neumann, ‘After Securitization’, p. 18. 
25 Neumann, ‘After Securitization’, p. 18. 
26 William R. Moomaw, ‘New Diplomacy’, Discussion Paper, Center for International Environment and 
Resource Policy, The Fletcher School, Tufts University (2012), available online at 
https://sites.tufts.edu/cierp/files/2018/02/New_Diplomacy-2012.pdf (accessed 2 March 2017). 
27 Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, Security, p. 27. 
28 Guzzini, ‘Securitization as a Causal Mechanism’, p. 340. 
29 Orford, ‘In Praise of Description’, p. 621. 
 threat [or non-threat] related, we can sum up the facilitating conditions as follows: 
(1) the demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security [or 
desecurity]; (2) the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the 
securitizing [or desecuritizing] actor — that is, the relationship between speaker 
and audience and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made 
in a securitizing [or desecuritizing] attempt; and (3) features of the alleged threats 
[or non-threats] that either facilitate or impede desecuritization.30 
 
These assumptions would seem to suggest that it is the ability to influence the target 
audience that is the key to the practice of (de)securitization. This conclusion resonates 
with Matti Jutila's insistence that ‘researchers should focus more on the part “accepted 
by the relevant target audience”’.31 The crucial point here is that desecuritization is not 
decided by the desecuritizing actor, but by the target audience. Security thus ‘ultimately 
rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but among [italics in the original] the 
subjects’.32 This is why non-state ‘new diplomats’ direct so much of their activity 
towards acquiring moral legitimacy. Moreover, 
 
The public domain, through vastly expanding modes of access to information and 
capabilities to communicate — and therefore organize into a network — grants this 
legitimacy based on what is widely desirable.33 
 
The securitization model as developed by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde does not 
address the complexity of practices that ‘new diplomacy’ can entail, however, and so 
offers limited guidance on how to trace this process. The norm entrepreneur model 
developed by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink provides a much fuller depiction 
of a process of norm influence. Thus, by extrapolating from Finnemore and Sikkink, we 
may gain further insight into the conditions and characteristics that we need to make 
visible. 
According to Finnemore and Sikkink, norm influence may be understood as a three-
stage process: (1) norm emergence, characterized by persuasion; (2) norm cascade, 
characterized by socialization; and (3) norm internalization, characterized by 
habituation.34 If we apply this model to diplomacy as practised by the HCNM, a more 
detailed and nuanced diplomatic process emerges. In the first stage, the HCNM attempts 
to convince a critical mass of governmental leaders that no ethnic threat exists based on 
a normative reframing of the public narrative to facilitate the integration of diversity. In 
the second stage, a dynamic of imitation is present, in which HCNM attempts to mobilize 
the wider population of a state to share in that reframed public narrative of respect for 
the integration of diversity. The exact motivation for ‘cascade’ in the second stage may 
vary across cases, but we can assume, following Finnemore and Sikkink, that social 
pressure for conformity, combined with an individual desire for self-esteem and 
acceptance, are likely to facilitate this process of wider social acceptance of diversity. 
Internalization occurs at the far end of cascade, when the integration of diversity 
becomes a habitualized part of the public narrative of daily life ‘amongst the subjects’. 
Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that in order to be effective, norm entrepreneurs 
require an organizational platform from and through which they are able to mobilize 
support for their norms.35 This suggestion resonates with Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde's 
                                               
30 Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, Security, p. 33. 
31 Matti Jutila, ‘Desecuritizing Minority Rights: Against Determinism’, Security Dialogue, vol. 37, no. 2 (2006), 
pp. 167–185, at p. 174. 
32 Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, Security, p. 31. 
33 John Robert Kelley, ‘The New Diplomacy: Evolution of a Revolution’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 21, no. 2 
(2010), p. 293. 
34  Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, 
International Organization, vol. 52, no. 4 (1998), pp. 895–898. 
35 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, p. 899. 
 claim that ‘the existential threat has to be argued and […] gain enough resonance for a 
platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures’.36 The 
platform from which an actor operates will greatly influence the resources and leverage 
that diplomatic actors are able to utilize in their attempts at persuasion and 
mobilization.37 For example, international organizations may exercise comparative 
moral advantage that facilitates persuasion and mobilization through discursive claims 
to integrity, truth and empathy. For this reason, ‘new diplomacy’ ‘possesses an 
advantage in its agility, relies on grassroots mobilization, and highlights the relevance of 
policy entrepreneurs’.38  
The HCNM operates from within an international organization — the OSCE — that 
has an explicit security agenda. This may, at least in part, explain why the original 1992 
mandate reflects a diplomacy of negotiation and compromise aimed at stabilization, 
rather than a more transformative rearticulation of the security problematique. The 
organizational platform afforded by the OSCE gives the HCNM access to both 
international and domestic security leaders whose support is crucial for persuasion and 
mobilization ‘amongst the subjects’. In this regard, the HCNM resembles ‘official 
diplomats’. At the same time, however, the HCNM possesses only limited financial and 
human resources and no direct powers of enforcement, and so in this respect is more 
akin to the ‘new diplomats’. As HCNM Knut Vollebæk explained: 
 
I can conduct on-site visits and engage in preventive diplomacy, in theory even 
without the consent of the state concerned. However, I cannot function properly 
without the political support of the participating States. In practice, therefore, I 
carry out my tasks in close consultation with them. Only with their backing can I 
make a meaningful contribution.39 
 
As a result, each HCNM must compensate for these ‘official’ institutional limitations by 
drawing upon personal resources — most notably integrity, diplomatic experience and 
professional networks — in order to succeed at persuasion and mobilization. 
Crucially, the successive HCNMs do not work alone, but in close collaboration with a 
staff of advisors. The organizational culture that these officials co-create forms a distinct 
worldview in which innovative practices may take root and grow. As Andrew Cortell and 
Susan Petersen have pointed out, staff in international organizations may construct 
their own identity ‘not simply as the agent of states, but also as a member of an 
international community delegated the responsibility of overseeing the community’s 
values’.40 Making visible these institutional cultures, and how they have evolved over 
time, is thus a key component of process-tracing ‘new diplomacy’. 
Usually, for norm transformation to reach the second stage and begin to ‘cascade’ 
through the target audience, it must become institutionalized in specific rules or 
administrative bodies.41 The HCNM possesses a considerable advantage with respect to 
institutionalization when compared to the ‘new diplomats’ in non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), because any general recommendation or guideline that the HCNM 
office produces will have this outcome. This effect explains why each successive HCNM 
has undertaken to produce general thematic recommendations and guidelines. Through 
these general guidelines, the HCNM is able to institutionalize policy recommendations. 
Finnemore and Sikkink, however, caution that institutionalization is not a necessary 
condition for progression to the second stage. They also acknowledge the possibility 
                                               
36 Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, Security, p. 25. 
37 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, p. 900. 
38 Kelley, ‘The New Diplomacy’, p. 294. 
39 OSCE HCNM Knut Vollebæk, ‘Fifteen Years of Conflict Prevention by the HCNM’, OSCE Yearbook (Baden-
Baden: Nomos: 2008), p. 330. 
40 Cortell and Peterson, ‘Synthesizing Rationalist and Constructivist Approaches to IOs’, p. 5. 
41 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, p. 900. 
 that, in some cases, institutionalization may follow rather than precede ‘cascade’.42 To 
the extent that norm influence and desecuritizing diplomacy are similar discursive 
processes, we should keep this caveat in mind when assessing the HCNM’s 
achievements. 
Finnemore and Sikkink contend that until a ‘tipping point’ is reached, transformation 
only occurs with support from ‘significant domestic movements’.43 But once this ‘tipping 
point’ has been reached, a different dynamic begins. More states adopt the new norm 
rapidly, even without domestic pressure for change. However, this contention is less 
relevant and potentially inappropriate when applied to desecuritizing diplomacy as 
practised by the HCNM. Because desecuritizing diplomacy involves a reconstruction of 
the prevailing public narrative away from the friend–enemy distinction, both remain 
contingent upon significant support ‘among the subjects’.  
Ultimately, the target audience (that is, the subjects) in the HCNM’s diplomacy is 
domestic. International praise or censure may facilitate domestic change (although we 
can also imagine scenarios where the reverse is more likely to be the case), but it is not 
itself sufficient to guarantee successful influence ‘among the (domestic) subjects’. 
‘People inside the “us” are in most cases better positioned to start new ontological 
narratives’.44 This intrinsic discursive limitation may explain the variable results 
achieved by the HCNM and international minority rights conditionality more generally. 
An authentic public narrative must be seen to have a popular authorship and 
corresponding ownership. For this reason, undoing the friend–enemy distinction is 
likely to require normative changes that create new political processes ‘among the 
subjects’: 
 
[…] frequent interactions among people […] would ultimately create predictability, 
stability and habits of trust. As trust becomes habitual, it would become 
internalized, and internalized trust would, in turn, change affect. [...] Changed affect 
meant changed identity and changed norms as empathy and identification with 
others shifted.45  
 
This characterization suggests that the process of desecuritizing diplomacy as practised 
by the HCNM is likely to be gradual, incremental and uncertain. As a result, it is 
reasonable to assume that rearticulating may occur, but with varying results. 
Rearticulation may fail to gain any acceptance from the target domestic audience. 
Alternatively, rearticulation may succeed in changing the prevailing friend–enemy 
narrative. At this extreme end of ‘cascade’, the integration of diversity should be widely 
accepted so that it achieves a ‘taken for granted’ quality.46 In other words, subjects 
would perceive the narrative of integration as ‘real’. Accordingly, their actions would 
reflect and reinforce this integrated social ‘reality’. For this reason, ironically, HCNM 
‘success’ may be harder to discern than HCNM ‘failure’; whereas conflict stands out as 
exceptional, normalcy is by definition unremarkable. 
Yet these two success/fail scenarios are not the only possible outcomes of 
desecuritizing diplomacy. There is likely to be a much larger in between category of 
cases that exhibit an altogether more contingent quality of becoming — that is, a 
particular diversity conflict may be stabilized, while the underlying friend–enemy 
construct remains, but is gradually blurring in the public imaginary. In situations of 
becoming, rearticulation ‘among the subjects’ of a state would be partial but still 
incomplete. Researchers are likely to see ethnic politics in states where the HCNM has 
been diplomatically active becoming rearticulated only with the benefit of hindsight. 
                                               
42 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, p. 900. 
43 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, p. 900. 
44 Jutila, ‘Desecuritizing Minority Rights’, p. 181. 
45 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, p. 905. 
46 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, p. 904. 
 Accordingly, our modus operandi should be to look for qualitative changes in the 
character of minority/majority debates across a broad spectrum of more or less 
integration and respect for diversity. 
 
 
Moving the HCNM Mandate from Stabilization to Rearticulation 
 
The mandate agreed at Helsinki in 1992 authorizes the HCNM to: 
 
[…] provide ‘early warning’ and, as appropriate, ‘early action’ at the earliest possible 
stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues which have not yet 
developed beyond an early warning stage, but, in the judgement of the High 
Commissioner, have the potential to develop into a conflict within the CSCE 
[Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe] area, affecting peace, stability 
or relations between participating States.47 
 
The clear implication of the mandate is that the HCNM is intended to preserve and 
protect the territorial status quo from any war, mass migration, secession or 
irredentism that might otherwise follow on from ethnic conflict. The HCNM may collect 
and receive information, visit states, discuss relevant issues with the parties concerned 
and, where appropriate, promote dialogue, confidence and cooperation between them.48 
If the HCNM concludes that there is a prima facie risk of potential conflict, (s)he may 
issue an early warning to the OSCE Permanent Council49 and may recommend that (s)he 
be authorized to enter into further contact and closer consultations with the parties 
concerned with a view to possible solutions.50 In short, the original 1992 mandate would 
seem to be a very good example of diplomacy as it is classically understood: negotiation 
within the existing rules of international law to promote stabilization. However, if we 
look beyond the text of the original mandate to consider the ways in which the HCNM 
has evolved over the past twenty years, a more complex and dynamic approach to 
diplomacy as rearticulation becomes apparent. 
When the first HCNM Max van der Stoel assumed this role on 1 January 1993, there 
were only a few standard-setting documents relevant to minorities that could be used as 
a basis for norm influence and persuasion, notably the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights 
(ICESR) and the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). The ICCPR, ICESR and 
ECHR are, in the main, human rights texts. As a result, these normative frameworks did 
not provide much guidance to ethnic-conflict dilemmas beyond the general requirement 
to ‘respect the rights of persons belonging to minorities’. Yet it was specific policy 
guidance that the newly securitized nationalisms in the post-communist states arguably 
required. The HCNM thus became a norm entrepreneur ‘not by design but out of 
necessity’.51 
Five distinct but mutually reinforcing strategies were almost immediately apparent 
in HCNM diplomacy from the outset: (1) the translation of existing normative standards 
into pragmatic policy proposals; (2) the elevation of existing norms to a more binding 
status; (3) the articulation of new norms; (4) the dissemination of norms; and (5) the 
                                               
47 Conference [now Organization] for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki Document (1992), 
chapter II, paragraph 3, available online at http://www.osce.org/mc/39530?download=true (accessed 6 
March 2017). 
48 Helsinki Document, chapter II, paras 11–12. 
49 Helsinki Document, chapter II, para. 13. 
50 Helsinki Document, chapter II, para. 16. 
51 Ari Bloed, comments to the author, at ‘HCNM 20 Years On’, European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) 
conference, Flensburg (6 July 2012). 
 mobilization of support for norms.52 Taken together, these strategies show us a practice 
of desecuritization in which a single actor (the HCNM) combines stabilization 
(translation and elevation) with rearticulation (norm articulation, diffusion and 
mobilization).  
The first two strategies — translation and elevation — are closest to the classic 
diplomacy envisioned in 1992. Both strategies take place in the context of visits to states 
of concern, according to paragraphs 23 and 24 of the mandate. During his country visits, 
the HCNM aims to identify the root causes of a conflict and to establish a dialogue 
between the parties concerned with a view to creating an atmosphere of understanding 
between them that is sufficient for a negotiated solution to the dispute. This is a 
traditional mediation role, albeit with a somewhat greater normative dimension than 
‘classic diplomacy’ envisions, bringing it closer to a revised ‘public diplomacy’ ideal.  
The country-specific correspondence made public by van der Stoel provides evidence 
of norm translation and elevation as key components of mediation. Although 
researchers do not have access to the correspondence of subsequent HCNMs Rolf Ekeus, 
Knut Vollebæk, Astrid Thors or Lamberto Zannier, it is reasonable to assume a degree of 
discursive continuity within the office of the HCNM owing to the institutional culture 
created by van der Stoel and his staff. The discursive strategies evident in van der Stoel’s 
letters, to the extent that they are the origins of an ongoing evaluative and reflective 
process internal to the office of the HCNM, may thus be taken as generally indicative of 
HCNM diplomatic practices. 
In the first quarter of 1993, van der Stoel visited Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. This 
Baltic trip took place in the context of increasing international concern regarding draft 
citizenship legislation that threatened to exclude large segments of the Russian minority 
permanently. These country visits were among the first conducted by an HCNM. The 
discursive engagement begun here established a pattern for the future. As predicted by 
Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, the discursive frames employed by van der Stoel ‘are about 
the future, about alternative futures — always hypothetical — and about 
counterfactuals’.53 
In a letter dated 6 April 1993 to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, van der 
Stoel makes clear that ‘such a policy would scarcely be compatible with the spirit, if not 
the letter, of various international obligations’.54 Citing article 15 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, van der Stoel recommends ‘that Estonia proceed to reduce 
the number of stateless persons permanently residing on its territory’.55 Van der Stoel 
then goes on to identify a number of policy provisions that Estonia should implement to 
achieve this inclusive objective. For example, ‘taking into account article 3, paragraph 6, 
of the Estonian Citizenship Act, Article 24, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and article 7, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child’, van der Stoel advises that ‘children born in Estonia who would otherwise 
become stateless should be granted Estonian citizenship’.56  
This manner of discursive engagement is constant across the communications from 
van der Stoel's eight-year tenure as HCNM. In his various letters, speeches and other 
communiqués, van der Stoel embeds his mediation efforts within existing international 
standards, while at the same time elaborating policy measures that are consistent with 
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 them. Van der Stoel's correspondence is replete with the language of minority/majority 
coexistence. Again, returning to the circumstances pertaining in Estonia in early 1993, 
van der Stoel points out that ‘the policy I advocate does not only require an effort on the 
part of the Estonian Government, but equally a contribution on the part of the non-
Estonian population’.57  
At the same time, however, there is a noticeable undercurrent of ‘danger’ associated 
with non-compliance that is itself a form of propaganda. Van der Stoel frames non-
compliance in a vocabulary of fear to dramatize both the importance of his advice and 
the risks incumbent upon those states that choose to ignore it. According to van der 
Stoel, to continue along the path of exclusive citizenship involves ‘a considerable risk of 
increasing tensions with the non-Estonian population’, a ‘strongly negative effect on 
relations between Estonia and the Russian Federation’, and ‘could lead to the 
destabilization of the country as a whole’.58 In marked contrast to this invoked 
doomsday scenario, van der Stoel is quick to point out that his ‘policy would greatly 
reduce the danger of destabilization’.59 
The second two strategies — articulation and dissemination of norms in the form of 
general recommendations or guidelines — were not anticipated in 1992 but emerged 
subsequently in response to perceived gaps in existing international standards. The 
general recommendations and guidelines articulate ‘best practice’ in a particular 
thematic area, drawing upon a combination of existing international standards and the 
HCNM's personal experience. The general recommendations and guidelines are typically 
drafted by independent experts at the request of the HCNM, according to the formula 
‘experts draw up, Commissioner endorses’.60 
During the tenure of first HCNM Max van der Stoel, three general recommendations 
were issued: the (Hague) Recommendations regarding the Education Rights of National 
Minorities (1996); the (Oslo) Recommendations regarding the Linguistic Rights of 
National Minorities (1998); and the (Lund) Recommendations on the Effective 
Participation of National Minorities in Public Life (1999). These general 
recommendations were not intended to merely restate the status quo; instead, van der 
Stoel's declared goal was ‘to be bold and creative while remaining within the 
parameters of international human rights law’.61 This goal suggests that van der Stoel 
understood himself to be engaged in norm entrepreneurship and regarded this activity 
as a necessary and legitimate part of his mandate.  
His successors have continued to act in this norm entrepreneurial capacity, 
reinforcing the office’s culture of rearticulation and, in so doing, progressively extending 
its mandate. Ekeus issued Guidelines on the Use of Minority Languages in the Broadcast 
Media (2003), as well as Recommendations on Policing Multi-Ethnic Societies (2006). 
Vollebæk initiated the (Bolzano/Bozen) Recommendations on National Minorities and 
Interstate Relations (2008) and the (Ljubljana) Guidelines on Integration of Diverse 
Societies (2012). Most recently, Zannier released the (Graz) Recommendations on Access 
to Justice and National Minorities (2017), begun under Thors. 
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 In 2014, after more than twenty years of diplomacy, HCNM Thors acknowledged 
‘This was and remains a unique mandate’.62 What makes it unique is that the office of 
the HCNM ‘has relentlessly promoted the concept of “integration with respect for 
diversity”’. According to Thors: 
  
[…] the concept is based on a twofold approach: first, all members of a society, 
whether majority or minority, should be able to maintain their own identity. [...] 
Second, we recognize that simply acknowledging and protecting diversity may not 
be sufficient to maintain peace. […] We can achieve this by promoting or building a 
shared sense of belonging to a common State and by having shared institutions that 
allow for the expression and negotiation of this diversity.63 
 
That rearticulation is consistent with both the securitization and norm entrepreneur 
models, each of which envisions norm change as a gradual process. Thus, for example: 
  
[…] desecuritization is the optimal long-range option, since it means not to have 
issues phrased as ‘threats against which we have counter-measures’ but to move 
them out of this threat-defence sequence and into the ordinary public sphere.64 
 
Such transformations are usually slow, because norm change (that is, rearticulation) is 
not something that can be achieved through negotiation and compromise alone; instead, 
it also requires a change in the public narrative and its underlying values and beliefs. It 
is via an incremental process of persuasion ‘through which agent action becomes social 
structure, ideas become norms, and the subjective becomes the intersubjective’65 that 
transformation of the friend–enemy distinction occurs.  
The final strategy — the mobilization of support for norms — is arguably the 
necessary enabling condition for successful implementation of all HCNM diplomatic 
strategies; this caveat applies to any discursive model of transformation, including both 
stabilization and rearticulation via diplomacy. Creating open-access networks of 
dialogue among states, NGOS and the public is conducive to profound discursive 
processes that can help the definition and framing of the parameters of the problem and 
the designation and implementation of responding policies.66 
Mobilization is very much in keeping with Martin Wight’s idea of the use of 
‘propaganda’67 and thus also strongly suggestive of a rearticulation. It is emblematic of 
‘new diplomats’ who ‘delve into transnational advocacy networks using their 
information and beliefs to motivate political action and to use leverage to gain the 
support of more powerful institutions’.68 Mobilization will be discussed more fully in the 
subsequent two sections. 
 
 
Rearticulating the Friend–Enemy Distinction via Education 
 
The first HCNM assumed office at the start of 1993, so researchers now have roughly 
twenty years of accumulated diplomacy to make visible in their analyses. During this 
time, the HCNM has been active in many former communist states, including Albania, 
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 Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine. In all these 
states — as documented by Minority Rights Group, the various opinions of the Advisory 
Committee of the Framework Convention for National Minorities and a wide variety of 
other sources, not least the office of the HCNM itself — minority/majority issues 
continue to be framed in the language of existential threat. Evidence of a continued 
friend–enemy distinction between majorities and minorities abounds. Crucially, 
however, ethnic conflict has been less than was anticipated when the HCNM was created 
in 1992; instead, violence has been sporadic and mostly limited to a few cases (for 
example, in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Kosovo, Macedonia and 
Ukraine), such that most former communist states are, at least, stable. Accordingly, 
commentators generally agree that the HCNM's stabilization efforts are mostly 
successful.69  
The critical question thus becomes: is there evidence of rearticulation towards the 
integration of diversity? The difficulty that confronts researchers looking to make this 
‘visible’ is that such examples are, by definition, hard to see by virtue of their very 
ordinariness. Yet it is precisely these unremarkable examples not classically associated 
with either security or diplomacy — what Jef Huysmans70 and Matti Jutila71 call the 
‘everyday’ — that may reveal specific issues where rearticulation by the HCNM is 
succeeding in changing the friend–enemy perceptions of the target audience. 
Accordingly, this discussion will focus on ‘everyday’ practices of minority language 
education. Language education has been selected both because it is an ‘ordinary’ public 
policy and because there is a history of HCNM practice in this policy area.  
The promotion of official language(s) through the educational curriculum has long 
been central to the creation of national narratives. The right of minorities to establish 
separate schools is a classic stabilization response to securitization that dates back to 
the interwar system of minority guarantees. In contrast, rearticulating the friend–enemy 
distinction suggests an integrative paradigm of education. In the words of HCNM Ekeus, 
‘This implies not only multicultural education in terms of content, but also inter-cultural 
education in terms of approach and process’.72  An educational curriculum that 
rearticulates enemies as friends would arguably facilitate the retention and acquisition 
of both minority and majority languages for all students, alongside the inclusion of 
diverse histories and cultures. According to HCNM Vollebæk: 
 
Integrated education is not only about putting children of various ethnic groups in 
one classroom. It is about democratic school governance. It is about interesting and 
inclusive textbooks. It is about creating joint activities. Equally important is the 
depolarization of curriculum and textbook development.73  
 
                                               
69 See, inter alia, Bruce Cronin, ‘Creating Stability in the New Europe: The OSCE High Commissioner on 
National Minorities and the Socialization of Risky States’, Security Studies, vol. 12, no. 1 (2002), pp. 132–163; 
David Galbreath and Joanne McEvoy, ‘European Organizations and Minority Rights in Europe: On 
Transforming the Securitization Dynamic’, Security Dialogue, vol. 43, no. 3 (2012), pp. 267–284; and Emily 
Pia and Thomas Diez, ‘Human Rights Discourses and Conflict: Moving towards Desecuritization’, in Raffaele 
Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci (eds), Civil Society, Conflicts and the Politicization of Human Rights (Tokyo and 
New York, NY: UNU Press, 2011), pp. 204–219. 
70 Jef Huysmans, ‘The Question of the Limit: Desecuritization and the Aesthetics of Horror in Political 
Realism’, Millennium — Journal of International Studies, vol. 27, no. 3 (1998), p. 580. 
70 Kleiner, ‘The Inertia of Diplomacy’, p. 321. 
71 Jutila, ‘Desecuritizing Minority Rights’, pp. 167–185. 
72 Address by OSCE HCNM Rolf Ekeus, ‘Education as a Means of Integration in Multi-Ethnic Societies’, 
Bishkek (3 November 2003), available online at http://www.osce.org/hcnm/13465?download=true 
(accessed 7 March 2017).
 
73 Address by OSCE HCNM Knut Vollebæk, ‘Integration versus Separation: Education in Multi-Ethnic 
Societies’, Sarajevo (18 March 2009), available online at http://www.osce.org/hcnm/36583 (accessed 7 
March 2017). 
 We see evidence of education as a means to rearticulate the friend–enemy distinction 
in the Hague Recommendations (1996), which were drafted under the direction of van 
der Stoel. Subsequent HCNMs have continued to advance this rearticulating paradigm of 
education. Educational programmes initiated by HCNM Ekeus emphasized that: 
 
[…] education in a multi-ethnic context should be concerned with the teaching of 
different languages, but it should also involve teaching the history and culture of the 
diversity of ethnic communities within the State, not just that of the national 
majority.74  
 
HCNM Vollebæk continued this focus on integrated education as an: 
  
[…] education system that does not assimilate or separate pupils, but rather tries to 
reconcile the two goals [… of] societal cohesion and individual identity, by providing 
a space for children to meet and learn how to understand and respect different 
cultures, languages and traditions.75 
 
 The HCNMs’ diplomatic efforts at desecuritizing national education frameworks are 
mostly to be found in South-Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.76 The HCNMs’ 
goal in pursuing these projects is arguably twofold: to ensure that opportunities exist 
for instruction in minority languages; while also guaranteeing proficiency in the official 
state (majority) language. In all cases, the HCNM has sought to balance requirements 
geared to the preservation of distinct minority languages with the promotion of 
minimum levels of majority language fluency that are necessary for full social, economic 
and political participation by minorities.77 Accordingly, such programmes should be 
regarded as examples of multilingual/multicultural integrative education, rather than 
minority language education. The ultimate objective of such projects is arguably the 
creation of a plural public narrative where prior friend–enemy distinctions no longer 
exist.  
The controversy in Macedonia concerning tertiary education in the Albanian 
language is a good example of such rearticulation in practice. In 1994, Albanian 
academics from the former Albanian-language faculty at Pristina University in Kosovo 
announced the creation of a ‘University of Tetovo’ in Macedonia’s largest Albanian-
majority city. The Albanian minority claimed that this Albanian university was 
necessary both to compensate for lower admission rates of Albanians to the University 
of Skopje and to provide a complete Albanian-language education for the Albanian 
community. The Macedonian government refused to fund the university or to recognize 
its diplomas. 
Through his public and private communications, HCNM van der Stoel translated the 
general language provisions of the ICCPR, the ICESCR and the Framework Convention 
into immediate policy guidance relevant to the desecuritization of higher education in 
Macedonia.78 Van der Stoel's communiqués show that he made clear these normative 
undertakings gave minorities the right to establish education institutions in their own 
language, but equally that this right did not extend to an automatic requirement for 
public funding or recognition.79 These initial managing moves created a space for 
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 compromise, which enabled the parties involved to shift ‘from clashes regarding rights 
to consideration of practical possibilities’.80 
At this point, HCNM van der Stoel initiated a series of programmes designed to 
rearticulate the friend–enemy distinction. In 1997, van der Stoel introduced a ‘transition 
year programme’ to improve ethnic Albanian admissions to the Macedonian state 
universities at Skopje and Bitola. Saturday classes in Macedonian were offered, taught 
by integrated teams of Albanian and Macedonian instructors. A handbook was also 
produced for teaching the Macedonian language to non-Macedonian students. According 
to HCNM Ekeus, by 2003, 80 per cent of the 1,200 students enrolled in the ‘transition 
year programme’ passed the university entrance exams.81 Van der Stoel also sought to 
elevate what might be construed as ‘soft law provisions’ of the Framework Convention 
by arguing that the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia permitted private 
educational institutions that were not funded by the state. From here, van der Stoel 
effectively mobilized international support for the 2001 creation of a South-East 
European University (SEEU) in Tetovo, backed by external funding. 
The SEEU was not created as an exclusively Albanian institution, but ‘was planned to 
be open to all as a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual university’.82 The long-range 
rearticulating goal was ‘to encourage students to learn to communicate effectively in 
both local languages of the region as well as in English and/or other international 
languages’.83 In 2004, a report by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) concluded that the SEEU had ‘exceeded its stated aims of 
contributing significantly to the solution of the problem of higher education in the 
Albanian language […] and of providing a multicultural approach to education’.84 Mainly 
because of pressure from the international community and following the success of the 
SEEU, the University of Tetovo was officially recognized by the government of 
Macedonia in 2004. Most recently, the 2005–2015 National Educational Development 
Programme for Macedonia has placed particular emphasis on multicultural and 
intercultural education.85  
HCNM diplomatic rearticulation of educational practices in Macedonia and elsewhere 
continues. Quite clearly, ‘Patience is required to see the effects of education reform’.86 To 
date, the friend–enemy dichotomy underscoring minority/majority identities persists 
throughout the OSCE region, albeit in various stages of attenuation. Rearticulating 
conflict into peace through the education system requires a combination of short- and 
long-term engagement. Some issues require immediate intervention, such as access to 
education, but to achieve an education system that provides education for all children, 
irrespective of their ethnicity, and that allows for interaction between ethnic groups is a 
long-term desecuritizing commitment.87 
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 Conclusion 
 
By using a ‘qualitative process-tracing approach’ to ‘make visible what is visible’ about 
the HCNM’s diplomacy, this article shows that ‘new diplomats’ ‘do desecuritization’ 
differently. Specifically, there is scope for representatives of international organizations 
to combine forms of stabilization and rearticulation in their desecuritizing practices. 
This blended practice is emblematic of the current ‘evolution of the revolution in 
diplomatic affairs’88 and provides a telling example of how ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ 
diplomatic methods may be joined for the common good. In the case of the HCNM, ‘doing 
desecuritization’ differently reveals a progressive evolution in the 1992 mandate from a 
‘classical’ to a ‘new’ form of diplomacy that is made possible by the office’s unique 
culture of rearticulation. The shared commitment of successive HCNMs and their staff of 
advisors to recast the friend–enemy distinction underpinning minority/majority 
(de)securitization has given rise to an expanding body of practice in policy areas that 
are not ordinarily associated with security. 
By rearticulating norms, as well as negotiating interests, the HCNM is able to escape 
the securitization ‘problematique’ that ‘locks people into talking in terms of security’.89 
‘New diplomats’ can initiative ‘fundamental transformations of the public sphere, 
including a move out of the friend–enemy distinction’90 within states, because their non-
state platforms and institutional cultures transcend traditional international 
dichotomies of ‘us’ and ‘them’.  
Admittedly, we never see a sudden or radical moment of transformation in the 
activities of the HCNM where the enemy ‘shreds its identity’ overnight. What is visible in 
the HCNM’s norm rearticulations regarding education is an incremental process of 
integration, in which ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ are gradually becoming reconstituted into 
something altogether different — a new kind of ‘normal’ where differences are present 
and welcomed. As HCNM Thors argues, ‘This is evolution, not revolution. And to achieve 
this, we need leaders with a vision that embraces the world’s complexity and does not 
simplify it’.91 Because ‘new diplomats’, like the HCNM, are ‘mobilized by moral 
legitimacy supplied by a collective, stateless will to somehow reorient the ethical 
foundations of states, and to change state behaviour’,92 they may be uniquely equipped 
to perform such rearticulations. 
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